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A Feminist Response to the Exon Bill 
Sarah Chester* 
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the Communications De-
cency Act (a.k.a. the Exon Bill) into law. 1 On June 11, 1996, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that it 
was unconstitutional, and enjoined the Justice Department from prosecuting 
any matter premised upon the Act.2 In December of 1996, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to hear the appeal.3 
This Note is about the Communications Decency Act and its implica-
tions for both feminism and the future of the internet. In the reprieve before 
an appeal is heard, it is worth taking stock of what is at stake for feminism 
in the way that the internet is regulated, and to understand how the act pur-
ports to do just that. Why should feminists care about this? What could be 
new or different about the electronic media that implicates feminism? 
Before beginning an analysis of what might be lost or gained through 
internet regulation, it is useful to briefly layout what the internet is and can 
be for women. The internet is a forum for expression. It offers educational 
possibilities, tools for education, access to information, sources leading to 
training in preparation for new jobs, news about job opportunities and other 
chances for learning. It also offers a means for political organizing and an 
extraordinary advance for grass roots campaigning. All of these offerings 
are available to the public as a whole, not just to women or feminists. Sig-
nificantly for women and critically for isolated minority groups, the internet 
provides a new leverage. By going online, traditionally disconnected groups 
can become connected ones. In sum, the internet "has achieved, and contin-
ues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this 
country ... has yet seen.',4 
• The author is a member of the Class of 1997, and is the 1996-97 Symposium Editor 
for the Hastings Women's Law Journal. She thanks Lynn Keslar and Professor Kate Bloch 
for their insight and encouragement. 
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 609 (1996). The Communications Decency Act, which makes up Title Vof 
the Telecommunications Act, is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a) - (h). 
2. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
3. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, _U.S.-, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996). 
4. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 881. 
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But that is just the beginning. There are also specific feminist needs that 
the internet already serves and could continue to serve. F or example, the 
internet is a safe medium for sexual discussion. Its safety derives from its 
anonymity and also from the current level of openness which leads internet 
users to discussions about sex, sexual health, sexual oppression, sexual 
identity, sexual discrimination, sexual violence and sexual story-telling. The 
sexual nature and explicitness of the discussions have received a lot of media 
attention but their usefulness and importance have not had much vocal 
feminist support. 
A central premise of this Note is that sex and sexual expression are po-
litical, and that opportunities to discuss and engage in conversations that ad-
dress sexual images, sexual role-making and sexual identities are crucial to 
feminism's strength.6 The geographic reach and potential diversity of the 
internet's audience, combined with its anonymity, make the internet an excel-
lent means to facilitate this discussion. 
Because the internet holds an interesting promise of both practical and 
theoretical possibilities for feminist enterprises it is thus essential to under-
stand the Act's impact. In assessing that impact, this Note situates itself in 
a feminist analytical methodology. It proposes to answer questions such as 
what is the current scheme of regulation and its impact on the internet in the 
absence of Exon's bill? What pieces of the bill (if any) might feminism wish 
to keep? What happens if the bill remains as enacted? Is there a different, a 
feminist, vision of the sexual representations on the internet that may lead to 
a different regulatory scheme? 
In answering these questions, the position of this Note is that femi-
nists should engage in the politics of sexual expression, rather than restrict 
it. For this reason, the position of this Note is one of great skepticism to-
ward government regulatory efforts which would hide, filter or ban that 
dialogue. This skepticism is directed at the political assumptions made by 
the regulators when deciding who needs to be protected and from what. This 
Note's analysis of the proposed regulations negotiates between two opposing 
feminist positions about sexual representation. These two opposing posi-
tions are represented by 1) the anti-pornography feminists who argue that 
pornography should be vigorously regulated because of the harm it causes 
5. I am referring here to alt.sex.stories, soc.feminism, World Wide Web feminist dis-
cussion groups, lesbian support groups on line, etc., which have had attention in Time, 
Newsweek, and The American Spectator, among others. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen 
Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38; Steven Le~y, A Parents' Guide to Sex on 
the Net, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 46; Robert Bork, An Electronic Sink of Depravity, 
~. SPECTATo~Feb.4, 1995,at22. 
6. This was a central position of the FACT group opposing an anti-pornography ordi-
nance in Indianapolis. Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief, Amici Curiae of Feminist 
Anti-Censorship Task Force, et al., in American Book Sellers' Ass'n v. Hudnut, 21 MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 69 (1987-88). 
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women; and 2) the anti-censorship feminists,7 who support the existing pro-
tections for pornography within First Amendment jurisprudence and would 
like to see even greater protection. 8 
Section one of this Note begins with a brief overview of current law 
regulating obscenity and indecency, which already poses dilemmas for ef-
fective internet regulation. Section two presents an analysis of the Exon Bill 
itself, and examines its failings under the current laws, including some of the 
implications for free speech if it passes. This Note presents speculation as 
to what anti-pornography and anti-censorship feminist reactions to the bill 
might be. The philosophy underlying these analyses and speculations is that 
it is important to confront the advocacy of protection for speech, including 
protection for pornographic, obscene and indecent speech, with the problems 
that such advocacy may entail. This confrontation strives toward the goal of 
creating a better, more knowing advocacy and a more aware and nuanced 
understanding of speech. Last, this Note proposes a new model that would 
accept and make room for different meanings, that would protect equality 
interests on the internet without broad, across-the-board, bans on categories 
of speech. 
A few notes of clarification and explanation before beginning. First, 
this Note does not directly address child pornography--meaning pornogra-
phy that uses children as its subjects. First Amendment jurisprudence has 
traditionally drawn a distinction between child pornography on the one hand 
and obscenity on the other.9 One rationale for this distinction is the States' 
interest in protecting children from the harmful experience of participating in 
the creation of pornography. 10 It has been argued by some anti-pornography 
feminists that this same overwhelming interest in preventing harmful effects 
also applies to women. 11 Yet there are critical issues of agency, understand-
ing and consent that are different for children than for women. 12 F or this 
reason, the Court's distinction between the two types of pornography stands. 
In keeping with the belief that they are different, this Note does not propose 
7. Robin West uses the tags "anti-pornography" and "anti-censorship" for these two 
different feminist analyses, as does Nadine Strossen. Robin West, The Femi-
nist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney General's Commis-
sion on Pornography Report, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 681, 684 (1987); see generally 
NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY (1995). 
8. See generally STROSSEN, supra note 7, for the view that freedom of expression, 
hence feminism, would benefit from fewer restrictions, not more. 
9. The Supreme Court defines obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
The Court defines child pornography New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
10. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749. 
11. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 35-37 (1993). 
12. I acknowledge that the categories "agency, understanding and consent" are catego-
ries determined by more than age or maturity. Economic pressure alone throws "consent" 
into question, and other factors play into each of the three. I would argue that a viable 
distinction still remains; however, a worthwhile discussion of this difference is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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how child pornography should or should not be regulated. That is a separate 
enterprise. 
Second, the term "internet" used here is shorthand for the communica-
tions infrastructure that the bill seeks to regulate. However, electronic 
communications are vast and multi-layered. Many people use the internet 
and the services it provides: in fact it is the existing resources of the internet 
and the World Wide Web that have the most potential for users as a whole 
and feminism in particular. The internet can facilitate electronic visits to the 
Library of Congress, sending mail to people at virtually any university, and 
participating in countless discussion groups, to name a few of many possi-
bilities. 13 The internet resembles a kind of interactive cable television serv-
ice with an astounding array of interactive programming. Online service 
providers, such as America Online, provide their own services in addition to 
access to the internet. Other online service providers and bulletin board 
services do not connect to the internet at all, but supply other services or in-
formation to subscribers. A rough analogy for the bulletin board services is 
a 900 number that a subscriber calls for a particular reason, but through 
which the subscriber can not tap into anything else. 14 What all of these have 
in common is that one uses one's computer and modem to do the communi-
cating. However, because the internet is often portrayed as the culprit in the 
media 15 and its services and potential are so vast, for the purposes of this 
paper, the "internet" is shorthand for the larger electronic communications 
structure. 16 
I. EXISTING LAW REGULATING OBSCENE AND 
INDECENT SPEECH 
This section provides a brief overview of how obscenity became unpro-
tected speech. It frrst will lay out how speech is currently regulated and the 
way in which indecent (but non-obscene) speech emerged as a target for re-
striction, and will then conclude with a look at some of the tensions and di-
lemmas in applying the current law to the internet. 17 By way of introduc-
13. For example, see Bork, supra note 5, for a long list of services that the internet 
provides. 
14. I am grateful to Tom Dowdy of Apple Computer, Inc., for his clarification of these 
models. 
15. See, e.g., Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 5; 141 CONGo REc. S8087-04 (1995) (Exon's 
floor remarks). 
16. A more complete map of the different services and how they interconnect can be 
found in the recent Georgetown Law Journal Symposium on Pornography on the Internet. 
See, e.g., Marty Rim, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 1849 (1995). The District Court opinions also contain descriptions and glossaries of 
terminology. 
17. See Pamela A. Huelster, Cybersex and Community Standards, 75 B.U. L. REv. 865, 
867 -73 (1995) (providing an overview of how "no existing form of media regulation prop-
erly applies to electronic bulletin board services"). 
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tion, it is important to note that "obscenity" is one of several categories of 
expression that are not protected under the First Amendment. Together with 
advocacy of illegal action,18 "fighting words,,19 and libel,20 obscenity is an 
area of speech where the Supreme Court has ruled that the States' need for 
regulation can outweigh the individual's right to speak.21 
There are several reasons why certain types of sexual expression were 
moved from the protection of the First Amendment to the mercy of the 
States' legislatures. The Court and several commentators have argued that 
"obscenity," or "hard-core" pornography, is not speech at all, but rather a 
sex -aid. 22 There is also a longstanding historical justification that the United 
States has "always" regulated obscenity: doing so is part of traditional gov-
ernment activity.23 For now, what is critical to remember about obscenity is 
that without constitutional First Amendment protections, the creator (and 
sometimes the purchaser) of sexually explicit material has only due process 
protection from legal sanctions.24 Ever since obscenity left the charmed cir-
cle of First Amendment protection, the questions in obscenity regulation in-
terpretation turn not on the right to speak, but rather on whether due process 
safeguards are properly in place.25 
A. ORIGINS: FROM COMSTOCK TO MILLER 
The reason for starting with the a brief history of obscenity law is to il-
lustrate how women's interests, needs, and livelihoods have been on the 
wrong side of "decency" or "obscenity" regulation for a long time. In the 
examples below, all kinds of women, from women who were abortion and 
contraceptive providers to women whose work and interests led them to 
avant garde literature, were prosecuted.26 
In the late 1800's, until well into the 20th century, the regulation of sex-
ual expression was dominated by Anthony Comstock and his successor, 
John Sumner.27 The Comstock Act prohibited a far broader spectrum of 
speech than the current obscenity standard.28 Comstock himself was a clerk 
18. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
19. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
21. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
22. Frederick Schauer, Obscenity and "Obscenity . .. Speech and "Speech" - An Exercise 
in the Interpretation o/Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899,928-29 (1979). 
23. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 57. 
24. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 487 (1970). 
25. Id. 
26. The first successful publication of Ulysses was also by a woman, Sylvia Beach, 
owner of Shakespeare & Company in Paris. EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK 
EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE AsSAULT ON GENIUS 20 (1992). 
27. Here, I am relying on Walter Kendrick's wonderful book. WALTER KENDRICK, THE 
SECRET MUSEUM: PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 125-57, 178-79 (1987). 
28. The Act provided, inter alia, "[t]hat no obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, 
picture, paper, print, or other publication of an indecent character, or any article or thing 
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in a dry goods store and a special agent of the Post Office.29 In this second 
capacity, he became "America's greatest anti-smut crusader,,,30 vigorously 
and ruthlessly enforcing his eponymous act. Walter Kendrick writes in The 
Secret Museum that Comstock boasted of fifteen suicides among those he 
accused, including the abortionist Madame Restell. 31 Sumner was reported 
to be more laconic, but even his prosecution of the Little Review for its pub-
lication of a chapter from Ulysses was devastating to the magazine's editors: 
It was like a burning at the stake as far as I was concerned. The 
care we had taken to preserve Joyce's text intact; the worry over 
the bills that accumulated when we had no advance funds; the 
tears, prayers, hysterics and rages we used on printer, binder, 
paper houses; the addressing, wrapping, stamping, mailing; the 
excitement of anticipating the world's response to the literary 
masterpiece of our generation. . .. And then a notice from the 
Post Office: BURNED. 32 
Comstock's regulation of obscenity through the mail also foreshadowed 
Exon's current attempts to regulate the internet. 
Today's far narrower obscenity standard followed a several-decade 
journey through different, less satisfactory and less workable approaches. 
One important early step was Judge Woolsey's ruling in u.s. v. One Book 
Called Ulysses that the novel Ulysses was not obscene because it had no 
"arousing effect.,,33 Although no lasting standard was achieved in this lower 
court case, it nevertheless signaled a move away from the highly restrictive 
Comstock era. 34 There were many Comstockian after-effects, however. For 
example, it took until 1952 for the Supreme Court in Butler v. Michigan to 
rule that adult interests and choices should not be governed by the perceived 
vulnerability of children.35 This ruling permitted sexually explicit materials 
to be available to adults, rather than, as previously, being banned from the 
marketplace entirely in a broad and unfocused effort to protect children. 36 
designed or intended for the prevention of conception or procuring of abortion, nor any ar-
ticle or thing intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use or nature . . . shall be 
carried by themail. .. Id.at134. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 136. 
31. Id. at 151. 
32. DE GRAZIA, supra note 26, at 14. 
33. United States v. One Book Called Ulysses by James Joyce, as discussed in DE 
GRAZIA, supra note 26, at 29-30. 
34. Id. at 22. 
35. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). Judge Learned Hand is frequently credited 
with initiating the move away from this position through his questioning the use of the 
"suitable for a child" yardstick for all adult expression. United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 
Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
36. Cf Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that sexual depictions of children under 
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Later, in the landmark Roth decision authored by Justice Brennan, the Court 
continued to loosen its grip on obscenity regulation, holding that a work 
must be "utterly without redeeming social importance," before it could be 
termed obscene and banned. 37 This was arguably the high water mark for 
free speech protection, as Roth's was a very difficult standard to meet. Fi-
nally, in 1973, the Court tempered Roth considerably and created the current 
Miller standard.38 
Under the Miller standard, in order to be categorized as obscene, a 
work, which must ftrst be "taken as a whole," must then be shown to appeal 
to the "prurient interest. ,,39 While the Court did not explicitly so state in 
Miller, "prurient" interest has been understood to mean "that which turns 
you on.',4() The Miller test requires that the work depict or describe, in a 
"patently offensive way," sexual conduct speciftcally defmed by the appli-
cable state law. Further, the work, again, taken as a whole, not fragmented, 
must be without "serious literary, artistic, political or scientiftc value. ,,41 
The Court explained that "patently offensive sexual acts" are "patently of-
fensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated" or "patently offensive representations or de-
scriptions of masturbation, excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the 
genitals. ,,42 Lastly, "obscenity is to be determined by applying 
'contemporary community standards' not national standards. ,,43 Impor-
tantly, the contemporary community passes judgment only on the "prurient 
interest" prong of the Miller test, not the question of literary, scientiftc, po-
litical or artistic value.44 
Miller is thus the primary ruling from which to judge an individual 
work. Many further rulings have defmed and limited the rights to own, buy, 
make, share and broadcast works. For example, in Stanley v. Georgia, the 
Court ruled that people had a right to have obscene material in their own 
homes.45 Under Stanley, anyone at home could read or watch even that 
which the government prohibits the bookstore from selling, or the video store 
from sending through the mail. While later cases sharply limited the ability 
of private individuals to obtain or receive pornography,46 Stanley remains a 
landmark ruling both for privacy rights and for obscenity law. Notably, 
the age of 16 was per se obscene, even if the depictions did not otherwise meet the Miller 
standard). 
37. Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 
38. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
39. Id. at 24. 
40. See Schauer, supra note 22, at 928. 
41. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
42. Id. at 25. 
43. Id. at 24. 
44. Pope v. Illinois, 418 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987). 
45. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
46. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 57; United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). 
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Stanley's privilege of privacy has reverberated in feminist theory, which has 
roundly criticized Stanley's implicit privileging of the private, of the home 
as a castle, where otherwise illegal things may happen. 47 
Succeeding courts have continued to wrestle with obscenity rights out-
side of the home setting. The Supreme Court focused on the prurient inter-
est, and the question of whether the material need appeal to the prurient in-
terest of the target audience, in Mishkin v. New York. 48 The work in 
Mishkin depicted, among other things, homosexual SIM scenes. Under 
Mishkin, the prurient interest test could be met if the jury thought this mate-
rial would appeal to the prurient interests of a gay or lesbian SIM commu-
nity-even if the jury had very little understanding of what these scenes were 
about. The Mishkin ruling is significant for many reasons, not least because 
it demonstrates the problem of notice within obscenity regulation. What if 
Mishkin's jury was wrong? What if they could not know? What if the gay 
SIM community used these books for informational or safety purposes only? 
By allowing a mainstream jury to decide the fate of work targeting the gay 
and lesbian SIM community, Mishkin allows juries to speculate about types 
of behavior they may know nothing about. Mishkin also shows how ob-
scenity regulation singles out the expressions of sexual minorities.49 The 
Court has openly revealed this prejudice, holding in Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc. that "wholesome, healthy and old-fashioned" depictions of sex 
were not obscene, whereas "shameful" and "morbid" representations were. 50 
In sum, the law governing "obscenity" first permitted free speech pro-
tection to be replaced with due process protection. Miller exemplifies this 
standard. However, in subsequent rulings, particularly with respect to no-
tice, even due process protections have been significantly eroded. 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF SLIGHTLY PROTECTED SPEECH 
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the Court produced a new 
way of dealing with sexually explicit materials. 51 In Young, the material at 
issue was not obscenity under the Miller test, and therefore was, in princi-
ple, protected, unregulable speech. But Young created what seemed to be 
new category of speech. The new category was low-value speech, "not 
worth marching our sons and daughters off to war for," and certainly not 
what the Supreme Court was willing to protect against Detroit's zoning 
regulations. 52 Rather, the Court in Young permitted the city to zone in such 
a way as to prohibit adult bookstores and movie theaters from operating 
47. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 11. 
48. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
49. Robin West makes this point beautifully in reference to the Meese Commission's 
report on pornography. See West, supra note 7, at 707. 
50. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1985). 
51. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
52. Id. 
HM¥t#i&JWiii , 
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within a certain distance of one another (or other regulated use establish-
ments, including theaters, bookstores, liquor stores and pawn shops). 53 
Once again, the Court willingly replaced First Amendment protection with 
due process protection. However, in this case the Court allowed the States' 
interest to intervene in an area of speech that should have been protected. 
But rather than protection, Young offers balancing of interests. 
Balancing continued in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., where the 
Court applied a time, place and manner restriction to this newly demoted 
form of speech. 54 Both of these rulings hold that it is permissible to zone 
such speech provided there are adequate alternate channels for expression. 55 
This has critical implications for the internet, and it had immediate applica-
tion for the next area of Supreme Court speech regulation: broadcast regu-
lation. 
In the manner of Young and Renton, broadcast regulations operate with 
the premise that there is a middle, less protected standard for "near obscene" 
speech. 56 In the context of broadcast regulation the Court maintains its two 
standards, obscenity and near obscenity, by permitting limitations on ex-
pression so long as there are contemporaneous outlets for near obscene 
speech. 57 Whereas in Renton the "other outlets" provision means that com-
munities must permit adult bookstores to operate in some areas; in the con-
text of television or radio, it means programming with adult content is per-
missible but must be limited to non-primetime hours. 58 
Where Young and Renton were anti-skid-row ordinances that supported 
cities' efforts to keep neighborhoods free from adult theatres, the broadcast 
regulations return to the idea that children should not be exposed to indecent 
expression, even if the expression is not outright obscene. 59 There are two 
conflated rationales here: fIrst, that children have unlimited access to televi-
sion (or radio) which the parents cannot control and second, that the televi-
sion ( or radio) audience is an unwilling prisoner in front of the TV and 
should be protected from television's intrusion. By way of confronting the 
confused rationales between the skid-row ordinances and the TV ones, at 
least one commentator has questioned the extent to which a television viewer 
is captive, and whether that viewer is less or more captive than someone in 
the street.60 Nevertheless, this is the language that the Court uses. 61 For ex-
ample, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the station was issued a reprimand 
53. Id. 
54. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
55. Id.; Young, 427 U.S.at 50. 
56. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
57. Id. 
58. Young, 427 U.S. at 50. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting quoting Judge Bazelon's circuit court opinion). 
61. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
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by the FCC for broadcasting George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" at two 
o'clock on a weekday afternoon.62 A car-radio listener and his fifteen year 
old son heard Carlin's riff on the seven words; six weeks later the father 
complained to the station. 63 In ruling that the broadcast was impermissible, 
the FCC limited the holding to the circumstances of the afternoon broadcast 
and the captive, young listener.64 Pacifica seemed to leave open the possi-
bility that a different medium which incorporated an express understanding 
of consent between the listener and provider might not be as strictly circum-
scribed. 
In addition to the "alternate channels" requirement, the broadcast regu-
lations approved by the Court and Congress's 1984 Cable Communications 
Policy Act65 suggest useful models for the internet.66 The Supreme Court's 
ultimate position seems to be that government may regulate in order to assist 
parents but governmental regulation will not step in to substitute for parental 
controls. Instead, a combined force of government, industry'S own efforts 
(via lock boxes, codes, scrambled images, credit cards for pay-per-view sta-
tions),67 and parents need to take responsibility for what their children see 
and hear. 
C. OBSCENITY LAW, INDECENCY LAW AND THE INTERNET 
Before turning to the Communications Decency Act itself, it is useful to 
note that traditional obscenity law assumes facts about viewers and purvey-
ors of sexually explicit materials that are not necessarily true or accurate 
when applied to the internet. Perhaps the best example of the clash between 
the law and the medium is in the "community standards" element of the 
Miller test. Although community standards already have their own com-
plexityand controversy, they are even more complex and controversial in the 
internet context. There is no anchoring community in a new world where the 
geographic boundaries of communities do not exist at all, yet the Justices in 
Miller seemed certain that one nationally based standard was inappropriate: 
the whole country should not have to live with a standard that would be ac-
ceptable "in New York or Las Vegas.,,68 Hence the Miller test of "obscene" 
62. For a description of the proceedings in Pacifica, see Michael I. Meyerson, The Right 
to Speak, the Right to Hear, and the Right Not to Hear: The Technological Resolution to 
the Cable/Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 137 (1988). 
63. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938 (2d ed. 1978). 
64. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
65. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.c. § 521 (1992). This is cur-
rently undergoing review and is subject to changes if the Helms amendment goes into ef-
fect. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Wrestle with TV Indecency Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
1996, at Al O. 
66. See generally Meyerson, supra note 62. 
67. Cable Communications Policy Act, supra note 65. 
68. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32. 
4 
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is a local one69 which may function adequately in a proceeding to close down 
a bookstore or a theater, where the community is physically present. 70 But 
"community" on the internet has nothing whatsoever to do with proximity to 
a site of obscene material. This presents serious problems with regard to 
due process protection afforded to obscene speech: if the community is 
culled from the place where an offended person downloaded images, there is 
no notice about or relevance to that community's standards for the transmit-
ter. 
The archetypal instance71 of the community standards problem regarding 
notice took place in the companion cases of United States. v. Robert Tho-
mas and United States. v. Carleen Thomas.72 The Thomases, a California 
couple who ran what they called the Amateur Action bulletin board service, 
were convicted of interstate distribution of obscene material. 73 Robert Tho-
mas provided a wide variety of material, some of it very hardcore and po-
tentially obscene in many jurisdictions; some of it displaying no more than 
Thomas' offbeat humor. 74 The drama in the Thomas cases derives from San 
Jose jury's decision, applying San Jose community standards that their ma-
terial was not obscene.75 In Tennessee, however, where the Thomas offer-
ings were downloaded by a Post Office agent - a modern day Anthony 
Comstock, perhaps - the jury found differently, and thus Robert Thomas 
sits in prison.76 
Other legacies from Miller pose interpretive problems when applied to 
the internet. For example, the Court in Stanley v. Georgia held that one 
could possess obscene materials in the privacy of one's home.77 However, 
obtaining obscenity from a bookstore, a movie theater or selling obscenity is 
69. Id. 
70. Miller more or less turns community standards into a jury issue. Interestingly and 
perhaps importantly there was no jury in the Ulysses trial which may have saved the book. 
DE ORAZIA, supra note 26, at 31. 
71. Anne Wells Branscomb points out that this case is more complicated than commen-
tators are admitting. As an example, there was contact between Thomas and the Postmas-
ter via the ordinary mail system, in addition to the internet contact. Anne Wells 
Branscomb, Internet Babylon? Does the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography on the 
Information Superhighway Reveal a Threat to the Stability of Society? 83 OEO. L.J. 1935, 
1948 n.71 (1995). 
72. For an exploration of these cases, see Huelster, supra note 17 (citing United States 
v. Robert A. Thomas, No. 94-20019-01-G (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (on file with the Boston 
University Law Review); United States v. Carleen Thomas, No. 94-20019-0 (W.D. Tenn 
1994) (on file with the Boston University Law Review). 
73. Id. at 866. 
74. Time reports that Thomas sells one picture with the line "Wait till you see this cutie 
sitting on the toilet!"--once downloaded this reveals itself to be a picture of a I5-lb. lob-
ster. Wendy Cole, The Marquis de Cyberporn, TIME, June 3, 1995, at 43. 
75. Huelster, supra note 17, at 866. 
76. Id. 
77. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 567. 
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not protected. 78 Thus defming where "obtaining" or "sending" begin and 
end and where "possessing in privacy" take over, are prerequisites, follow-
ing Stanley, for regulating electronic communications. The "obtaining" 
prohibited in Reidel and other cases limiting the Stanley holding, was an 
"obtaining" which reflected the models of the customer and the book shop, 
or the person awaiting a delivery from across state lines. But these models 
do not mesh with internet communications in which items are instantane-
ously "sent" and "received." Further, state lines have no application in an 
environment without a physical geography. 
All of these problems zero in on a core issue in the regulation of ob-
scenity: notice. Because violation of an obscenity law entails a criminal 
sanction, notice plays a key role in ensuring some sort of due process pro-
tection is in place. A prosecution under obscenity law exposes the pur-
chaser, creator or owner's private interest to the gaze of prosecutors and the 
public. Personal expectations of privacy for purchasers and creators are in-
verted with potentially extreme consequences,79 whether or not the prosecu-
tion is successful. Whatever one's perspective on the merits of regulating 
this kind of expression, understanding the boundaries of what is and is not 
legal, of what will subject one to sanctions versus what is protected is criti-
cal for establishing simple due process protection. A creator, seller or re-
ceiver and viewer needs to know where the definitions of the legally permis-
sible lie. As unpredictable a task as this was previously, it is far more so 
now on the internet. In a medium where interactions with other people are 
often fragmentary back and forth conversations, defming "taken as a whole" 
is problematic. In a medium in which geographical boundaries cease to have 
any kind of meaning, it is similarly difficult and perilous to second-guess the 
community standard to be applied to what a person writes or draws or lets 
someone else know. In a medium which people have made such a part of 
their lives that communications are often spontaneous, off the cuff and un-
thinking, prior notice of the potential illegality of one's acts is essential. 
In sum, traditional obscenity law was not ready for the challenges and 
nuances of the internet environment. 80 The question today is whether the 
newly signed law will be any better suited to the new technology and culture. 
II. THE EXON BILL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND 
THE INTERNET 
This section first presents the relevant portions of the text of the new 
law, and then offers an analysis of it in the context of current First Amend-
78. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 69; United States. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). 
79. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
80. None of these arguments challenging application of existing obscenity law in the 
internet environment were broUght Up in the ACLU cases. Both cases focused uniquely on 
the use of "indecency" in the statute . 
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ment obscenity and indecency regulation. Following that will be an evalua-
tion of the law's potential impacts in the context of the internet. It is worth 
noting that the Exon Bill is not an atypical obscenity statute. 81 The reasons 
that it deserves this special attention is because of the way it will operate in 
the dramatically different internet medium. 
A. THE LAW ITSELF 
The Act's drafters consider it vital to make the internet safe for families 
and children. 82 Senators Jim Exon and Dan Coats both introduced the bill 
spurred on by the danger, as they saw it, that obscenity, sex and pornogra-
phy were taking over the internet. Their dual goals were protecting children 
from the sight of pornography and violent sexual images while protecting 
women from the potential pain and harassment of pornography on the in-
formation superhighway.83 Senator Exon had successfully attempted to view 
various types of pornography using different on-line services only to be 
"startled,,84 by what he was able to see. The Exon Bill was born from the 
Senator's experience. 
The original introduction of the Exon Bill was contemporaneous with 
publicity about the availability of a wide variety of pornography, including 
violent pornography,85 depictions of bestiality and child pornography,86 and 
incidents of solicitation and harassment between minors and adults. 87 
Against this background, Senators Exon and Coats introduced a bill to stop 
what they saw as an erosion of our society. 88 The Exon Bill is part of a 
larger Telecommunications Act. 89 Its initial innovation is to update current 
telephone regulations to the computer age, often by changing the word 
"telephone" to "telecommunications device" which also includes computer 
networks, modems and the internet. The text of the 47 U.S.C. § 501(1), as 
modified, prohibits 
[W]hoever (in the district of Columbia or in interstate or foreign 
communication) (A) by means of a telecommunications device 
knowingly" (i) makes, creates or solicits, and (ii) initiates the 
81. Robert and Carleen Thomas were punished under a statute with nearly identical 
language. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1988). Huelster, supra note 17, at 866. The Exon Bill itself 
is an update to the telephone law which also had the same language. 47 U.S.C. § 223 
(1994). The Comstock Act used a similar phraseology. See KENDRICK, supra note 27. 
82. 141 CONGo REc. S8087-04 (1995) (Exon's floor remarks). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See Cole, supra note 74. 
86. Bork, supra note 5. 
87. Police Cruise the Information Superhighway, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 8, 
1995, at 1; Joan Lowenstein, How Free is Free Speech in Cyberspace? Perspective, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 12, 1995, at CI. 
88. 141 CONGo REc. S8087-04 (1995) (Exon's floor remarks). 
89. Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 609 (1996), supra note 1. 
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transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, 
image or other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious 
filthy or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass 
another person; (B) by means of a telecommunications device (i) 
makes, creates or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, 
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other 
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the 
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless 
of whether the maker or such communication placed the call or initiated 
the communication ... shall be fined no more than $100,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 2 years or both .... 90 
The new regulation continues in a subsequent section: 
[And] . . . [Whoever] uses an interactive computer service to send to 
a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any 
interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a 
person under 18 years of age any comment request, suggestion, pro-
posal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or de-
scribes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, re-
gardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initi-
ated the communication . .. shall be fined no more than $100,000 
or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both .... 91 
Because the law deals with obscenity, it must comply with Miller to 
meet a threshold constitutionality standard. It does not. The new law's ini-
tial constitutional conflict appears to be its broader standard prohibiting the 
"lewd lascivious, filthy obscene and indecent." The constitutional defmition 
of "obscene" refers to "patently offensive depictions of ultimate sexual 
acts. ,,92 Certainly under the Miller test, section 501 (1) does not supply a 
sufficiently narrow scope of expression for most communication. The newly 
enacted law, unlike the previous bill, is more specific in section 501(2) bor-
rowing language from Miller to defme what it prohibits. The failure to 
specify in subsection (1) and the disparity between subsections (1) and (2) 
raise a question of constitutional vagueness, which in turn suggests that the 
Exon Bill does not provide the necessary notice to a potential defendant. 93 
However the Court has provided some relief for legislators who draft in 
90. The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a). 
91. The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) 
92. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
93. Hamling v. United States holds that defendants must be aware of the character of 
the material in order to be held criminally liable. Hamling v. U.S, 418 U.S. 87, 123 
(1974). 
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such a "synonym mongering" fashion:94 under Ward v. fllinois courts could 
provide a narrowing construction of existing statutes to reconcile them with 
Miller. 95 While this appears to spare the Exon Bill its constitutional con-
flict, it presents even more of a due process problem for the internet using 
public. This holding gives wide latitude for interpretation of the material 
after the fact and little advance warning to the purveyor. There is perhaps 
even more latitude embodied in a ruling in another case, Brockett v. Spokane 
Arcades, in which the word "lust" was held to be unconstitutional "only in-
sofar as the word 'lust' is understood as reaching protected materials. ,,96 
Further, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, following Miller, has explicitly 
held that "lascivious," like "lewd," was a "commonsensical term whose 
constitutionality was specifically upheld in Miller.,,97 Therefore, although 
the Exon Bill seems far too broad, the language is subject to a narrowing 
interpretation by judicial review. While this makes the law look at least su-
perficially less constitutionally suspect, if anything, it makes the notice 
problem much worse. 
In comparing Exon to Miller, another conflict arises in the law's lack of 
exceptions for works with artistic, literary, political or scientific value. Un-
der Miller, "serious artistic, literary, political or scientific value redeemed a 
work.,,98 
Yet another problem is presented by the Exon Bill's inclusive terms 
prohibiting the transmission of as little as "a suggestion, a comment," that 
contains indecency or obscenity,99 unlike l\filler, which required that the 
work must be "taken as a whole. ,,100 Because the Exon Bill does not include 
this language, it thus opens up the possibility of a prosecution based on use 
of fragmented depictions, representations or "suggestions." In this respect, 
Exon is a more blatant violation of Miller. This conflict again presents the 
possibility that the Exon regulation is simply unconstitutional. 101 
Exon's biggest departure from Miller is that its categories of obscenity, 
filth, lewdness and indecency have no defining community reference point. 
The bill does not indicate who decides what is obscene and for whom. While 
subsection (2) of the bill refers to a community standard, the law does not 
94. For synonym mongering obscenity definitions see KENDRICK, supra note 27. "Much 
anti-obscenity legislation reflects the same busy concern with plugging up all possible 
loopholes, although as several critics have pointed out, such words as "indecent," "lewd" 
and "obscene" can be defined only in terms of one another, producing a closed system that 
thwarts even the most assiduous inquiry into what any part of it might mean." Id. at 160. 
95. Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977). 
96. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
97. United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1288 (1992). 
98. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
99. The Communications Decency Act, § 501 (1), 110 Stat 56. 132-133 (1996). 
100. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
101. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 123. 
94 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1 
say how community is to be determined. 102 Subsection {l), with a broad 
potential impact on internet users, does not provide a source for the standard 
at all. 103 The bill appears to conflict with other aspects of obscenity law be-
cause the standard proposed by Senators Exon and Coats was designed to 
protect children. This desire to protect children reopens the questions that 
were settled in Butler v. Michigan, and again in Pinkus. In both those cases 
the Supreme Court ruled that the world could not be regulated for the needs 
of children, which the Exon Bill purports to do. 104 Thus, Exon's bill appears 
to be squarely in conflict with obscenity law. 
Before the Supreme Court articulated the Miller standard, it decided 
another obscenity case which was an interesting throwback in many ways to 
the earlier prosecution of Ulysses. 105 In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Co. v. 
Board of Regents, the Court explicitly repudiated legislation that acted as 
one track moral advocacy.106 The Court was considering the film Lady 
Chatterly's Lover. The advocacy at issue was the "promotion of adul-
tery.,,107 Kingsley exemplifies both the dilemmas within First Amendment 
jurisprudence and the tension between regulating decency and regulating 
thought. The Exon standard, with its own one-track mindedness, does not 
concern itself in these distinctions, and thus may flunk the Kingsley test. 
What happens to the site that provides the film version of Lady Chatterly's 
Lover on-line? And if children see it? The service provider might spend one 
hundred thousand dollars and two years in jail, now that the Exon Bill has 
taken hold. 
Arguments in support of the Exon Bill are similar, however, to the ar-
guments made in support of broadcast regulations of near obscene speech. 
This analogy is strongest when the laws sponsors make the argument that on 
the internet, children have access which their parents cannot control. 108 
These were some of the arguments made in Pacifica, which established 
constitutional rules for regulating the decency of broadcast media 109 The 
captive audience argument made in Pacifica is less apt than the parental 
control argument because the computer has so many different functions. 
But once on the internet, one can certainly be harassed or receive unwelcome 
102. The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1996). 
103. Id. 
104. Butler, 352 U.S at 380; Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978). But cf Fer-
ber, 458 U.S. at 747. 
105. DE GRAZIA, supra note 26, at 25-32. 
106. Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). This case predates 
Miller but is subsequent to Roth. 
107. Id. This is a particularly problematic work for a feminist and a free speech analysis. 
Lawrence was opposed to permitting obscenity and indecency to be published, and felt 
strongly that his work was not that. See DE GRAZIA, supra note 26, at 30-40. In this re-
spect, Lawrence articulates a nice, irony-laden example of the subjectivity of the standard. 
108. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 5. 
109. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
H 
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mail. 110 This seems to be another suitable justification for a regulation under 
Pacifica. 
However, if the Exon Bill is to follow the model of broadcast regulation, 
upheld in Pacifica, it needs to provide alternative channels for the expression 
of indecent speech. III The bill fails to do this. All of the categories of 
speech are criminalized by the Exon Bill; the level of penalty varies when the 
work falls into the hands of a younger internet user. There is no legitimate 
outlet. 
C. THE BILL AND THE MEDIUM 
While public attention has centered on the bulletin board pornography 
services, the first victims of the Exon Bill are likely to be the original, ongo-
ing and potential services that the internet provides to students, teachers, 
academics, libraries, hospitals and universities. 112 These services will be 
vulnerable in a number of ways. First, the Exon Bill has none of the value 
exceptions (artistic, political, literary, scientific) which were crafted in re-
sponse to criticism of earlier obscenity law. 113 These values serve to protect 
expression despite obscene-seeming elements. But Exon's bill is not drafted 
for protection. On its face the law would seem to immediately threaten sev-
eral existing internet AIDS newsgroups which provide explicit sexual infor-
mation. 114 It would make most library retrieval services subject to censor-
ship. 
Another vulnerability is the Exon Bill's prohibition on obscenity in even 
small, fragmentary, "suggestion" form. This could subject many people to 
prosecution. It is difficult to employ "the work taken as a whole" methodol-
ogy satisfactorily in an electronic medium in which people work and com-
municate radically differently, relying on editing, re-editing, alteration and 
maintenance of several versions of one text. Exon' s bill, which addresses 
obscenity and indecency at such a minute, fragmentary level is more modern 
110. The story of Mr. Bungle is one example. See Branscomb, infra note 187 and ac-
companying text. 
111. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
112. Section 223 (t) specifically mentions non-profit libraries and universities. The gist 
of this section would appear to be that states may not impose different, more onerous 
sanctions for violations of the Communications Decency Act, although they may encourage 
regulation procedures, so long as they affect only intrastate activities. Under § 223(g) the 
Act reminds us that the Federal government is not limited by anything in this bill. The 
Communications Decency Act, § 47 U.S.C. § 223. 
113. See, e.g., David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral 
Theory o/the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974); DE GRAlIA, supra note 26. 
See also KENDRICK, supra note 27, at 150; STROSSEN, supra note 7, at 31, 225-29 
(discussing obscenity regulation and the Comstock Act and the following time period with 
limitations on contraceptive and other gynecological health related issues). 
114. X-Citement Video held that the purveyors only had to know the character of the ma-
terial, but not whether or not it was legally obscene in order to be held criminally respon-
sible. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1290 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 119-120). 
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than Miller in this respect, as Miller dates from an understanding of repre-
sentations and communications as whole and fmal in form. 
The absence of reference points for a community or national standard 
reintroduces a third issue, one concerning tastes and tolerances which Miller 
helped to minimize. As illustrated in the Thomas cases, on the internet, the 
expectation and understanding of what "community" is not so much re-
gional, but rather cultural. l15 
Beyond these institutional threats, the Exon Bill poses several immediate 
threats to individual users. For one, the bill's failure to recognize that inter-
net correspondents may never physically meet each other is particularly 
problematic and poses the notice problem most directly. Under the Exon 
Bill, transmission of material to someone under eighteen, whether knowing 
or not, is subject to criminal sanction. The actual knowledge of one another 
on the internet is very slight. Exon portrays this anonymity as dangerous. 
However, it is surely also one of the medium's strengths. Anonymity and 
confidentiality offer protections that enable users to discover more about the 
world and themselves. Making internet users criminally responsible for 
communications to an unseen person in an unknown place would eliminate 
that freedom, for all but the most technically astute users. 
Another threat to individual users is illustrated by potential application 
of the Mishkin rule. The Court in Mishkin provided a rule that targeted 
material produced by and for sexual minorities. 1l6 Taken together, Mishkin 
and the possibility for large-scale internet monitoring turn the Exon Bill into 
an especially powerful censorship tool. Discussion among sexual minorities 
has flourished on the internet, thanks to anonymity and the absence of social 
censure. There are strong feminist and free speech arguments in support of 
this discussion, but it certainly looks endangered under the Exon Bill, 
prompting some critics to suggest that the sexual discussion, not the pornog-
raphy is the real target of the bill. 1 17 
Many of these threats could have been alleviated but Exon deliberately 
avoided basing his bill on the broadcast and cable models. 118 We are in an 
unprecedented situation, he says, for which those models are insufficient. 119 
He has expressed a fear that children understand computer technology better 
than parents. 120 Further, Exon's opinion of the material he downloaded led 
him to believe that the internet content was much worse than cable television 
content. 121 The Exon Bill seeks to impose a more direct control. 
115. Huelster, supra note 17, at 866. 
116. Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 508-09. 
117. 141 CONGo REc. S8987-04, supra note 82 (remarks of Senator Exon when he reels 
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There are also several important distinctions between the internet and 
cable television regulation. For example, jurisdictional issues are completely 
different for cable operators sending material via satellite and the massive, 
multi-directional communications on the internet. The internet is also a 
means for people to directly communicate with one another via e-mail and 
chat rooms. This has produced a certain amount of harassment and un-
wanted sexual solicitation. The internet as a whole has no recognized, li-
censed gatekeepers, whereas cable television does. Thus, there are unques-
tionably far fewer controls on what gets posted to the internet. 
But if the goal of the Exon Bill is to protect children from access and 
satisfy First Amendment requirements, the cable television model remains a 
far better one than the Senator's own proposal. Under the broadcast and 
cable television models, it is not only government's responsibility but a 
shared responsibility between industry, parents and government support for 
a ratings enforcement system. Under the cable model, opportunities for dif-
ferent kinds of viewing must be made available. 
III. TWO FEMINIST REACTIONS 
This section presents two feminist reactions to the Exon Bill includ-
ing their understandings of the use and value of the internet. The fIrst reac-
tion is purely speculative. It is constructed from current feminist 
anti-pornography writingS. 122 The second reaction is drawn from the writ-
ings of feminists who believe that feminism's best ally is the broadest pos-
sible protection of speech. 
A. MACKINNON AND THE EXON BILL 
Women Against Pornography (W AP) is a twenty year old movement led 
by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. Since MacKinnon's work 
articulates the most forceful and encompassing feminist anti-pornography, 
speculation on a W AP response to the Exon Bill uses her writing as its pri-
mary reference. 123 
To MacKinnon, pornography is pervasive, has always been so, is even 
122. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1989); 
MACKINNON, supra note 10; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Vindication and Resistance: A Re-
sponse to the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography in Cyberspace, 83 GEO L.J. 1959 
(1995); The First Amendment under Fire from the Left. A Conversation with Floyd 
Abrams and Catharine A. MacKinnon, in DEBATING SEXUAL CORRECTNESS: PORNOGRAPHY, 
SEXUAL HARAsSMENT, DATE RAPE, AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL EQUALITY 101 (1995); 
ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A 
NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988) [hereinafter DEBATING SEXUAL CORRECTNESS]' 
123. Henry Louis Gates says of MacKinnon's feminist theory: "[L]ike that of Marx, the 
name of MacKinnon designates a body of argument that can no longer be distinguished 
from a political movement." Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory 
and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX 17-58, 20 (1994). 
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more so now and a significant effort is needed to regulate it. 124 MacKinnon 
is a dissenter from and powerful critic of existing obscenity law, not because 
of its fuzzy, inarticulate morality, but because of what she regards as the 
law's bald sexism. 125 To MacKinnon, hegemonic culture is a regime where 
pornography is encouraged to flourish, not only at the expense of women, 
but in order to subordinate women. 126 Obscenity law is a male sleight of 
hand, perfectly displayed in rulings such as Stanley, whereby men's oppres-
sion of women via pornography is masked as a constitutional right to pri-
vacy.127 
It is important to note that MacKinnon has effectively changed the terms 
of the legal debate. Instead of discussing obscenity, with its carefully 
crafted "test" and legal barricade, MacKinnon uses the word pornography, 
which, legally speaking, has no defmition at all. This change in terminology 
is indicative not only of MacKinnon's deep disdain for obscenity law, but 
also of her own formidable influence on framing the debate about how 
women may be depicted. Whatever pornography's original meaning,128 it 
now signifies a political discussion about representations of women and 
whether and how to regulate them. Because that is a meaningful category 
for the purposes of analyzing the goals and impact of the Exon Bill, this pa-
per will use "pornography" as well. As MacKinnon uses the word, pornog-
raphy unquestionably has a broader, more overt and explicit political mean-
ing, calling the bluff of the Court's implicit claim to neutrality and "point of 
viewlessness.,,129 The term "pornography" in MacKinnon's work refers to 
"a form of discrimination on the basis of sex,,130 and can signify any visual 
depiction of sex or of women in degrading poses. This is W AP's own 
sleight of hand: pornography has no fixed meaning, it is everywhere and it 
can be anything. 
MacKinnon attributes three types of harm to pornography: harms 
against women who are coerced or are forced for economic reasons to pose 
or act out pornography, harm to women who have pornography used against 
them as a kind of screenplay for rape and domestic violence, and harm to all 
women as a class for whom pornography is sexual discrimination. 131 A si-
multaneous strength and weakness of MacKinnon's writing is how these 
three groups of victim-women merge and separate from one another 
124. See MACKINNON, supra note 11. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Domination, in FOUNDATIONS 282 (D. 
Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). 
128. See Richards, supra note 109; KENDRICK, supra note 26. Both identify 
"pornography" as stemming from the word for writing about prostitution. 
129 . CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 213 (1989). 
130. See The Model Ordinance in A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY, supra note 122. 
131. See MACKINNON, supra note 11. 
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throughout her descriptions of different kinds of harm. 132 The result for the 
reader is that one is hoodwinked into feeling that each experience is equally 
bad, or even, MacKinnon seems to suggest, that they are all the same thing. 
In Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women's Equality, 
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin map out a means for addressing these 
harms and redressing pornography's imposition of inequality. To achieve 
this, the authors propose a Model Ordinance or the "Indianapolis Ordi-
nance" which is the law at issue in American Booksellers' Ass'n v. Hud-
nut. I33 Understanding how the Model Ordinance was intended to work and 
its reasons for existing offers insight into MacKinnon's perspectives on the 
Exon Bill and regulation of obscenity on the internet. First, the Ordinance 
defines the regulable category of pornography: 
Pornography is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex. 
(1) Pornography is the sexually explicit subordination of women, 
graphically depicted, whether in pictures or words, that also in-
cludes one or more of the following: (i) women are presented dehu-
manized as sexual objects, things or commodities; or 
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or hu-
miliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experi-
ence sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as 
sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically 
hurt; or (v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; 
or (vi) women's body parts -including but not limited to vaginas, 
breasts and buttocks --are exhibited such that women are reduced 
to these parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or 
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; 
or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, 
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or 
hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual. 134 
The language used to defme pornography has been culled from the tes-
132. See, e.g., the opening pages of ONLY WORDS in which MacKinnon addresses the 
reader as "you" and you are the subject of multiple scenes, some of pornography, with the 
pornography of MacKinnon's pages, and others are "real" but nonetheless are porno-
graphic for the ONLY WORDS reader. You become the woman who is harmed, the spectator 
who can't distinguish between pornography and the real world and the culture confused by 
the lack of difference. MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 3-7. 
133. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). This ordi-
nance, in slightly modified form became law in Canada. See Gates, supra note 123, at 23; 
STROSSEN, supra note 7, at 19. 
134. DWORKIN & MACKINNON, A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY, supra note 122, at 
101. The use of men, children or transsexuals in the place of women is also pornography. 
Id. 
100 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1 
timony of women who experienced pornography as harm in these specific 
ways. 135 The offenses using this kind of pornography include 
"discrimination by trafficking in pornography," "coercion into pornographic 
performance," "forcing pornography on a person" (this includes in a place of 
employment, education and the home) and "assault or physical attack due to 
pornography.,,136 
The ordinance attacks the underlying theory hidden in today's obscenity 
law. The ordinance drafters challenge existing law to acknowledge its own 
values and propose to expose its "First Amendment pieties,,137 for what they 
are. By creating a specific category of pictures to prohibit and by articulat-
ing the political reasons that the images require regulation, the drafters 
challenge the stated political neutrality of existing obscenity law. This is a 
complete departure from current First Amendment structure and values. 
The challenge here is not to make obscenity law less political, but rather a 
charge that the politics which is already inscribed in current obscenity law is 
a sexist one that is harmful to women. Because the First Amendment pro-
tects pornography, erotica, and other allegedly degrading and humiliating 
depictions of women, and because this is deeply harmful specifically to 
women, there is nothing neutral or virtuous about this right, assert MacKin-
non and Dworkin. In their analysis, Stanley's privacy right is a shield be-
hind which oppression of women can continue. 138 What is "free," they ask, 
about a "free speech" protection that enslaves women? This is a Constitu-
tion that masks a social atrocity, says MacKinnon. 139 
Revealing obscenity law as ideologically based allows the Model Ordi-
nance to respond with a different ideology, one which is upheld by prohibi-
tions on speech, on expression and on depictions of women that MacKinnon 
fmds harmful to women. MacKinnon's description of what is "harmful to 
women" is very broad, leaving the ordinance as wide open to abusive inter-
pretation as the Exon Bill. MacKinnon's ordinance doesn't require that a 
work "taken as a whole" be pornographic--one of the reasons the Indian-
apolis incarnation of the ordinance failed its constitutional test in court. 140 
In response to this ruling MacKinnon retorted, "if a woman is subjected, 
why should if matter that the work has other value?,,141 The ordinance and 
135. See West, supra note 7, at 686-90, for a brief introduction to some of these specific 
experiences. 
136. See DWORKIN & MACKINNON, A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY, supra note 122. 
137. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THINGS AS FREE SPEECH ... AND IT'S A GooD 
THING, Too 110 (1989). 
138. MacKinnon, supra note 127. 
139. MacKinnon, supra note 122. 
140. American Booksellers' Ass 'n v. Hudnut, 598 F .Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
141. American Booksellers' Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325. There is every reason to 
criticize her glibness as an affront to artistic freedom and a baldly pro-censorship state-
ment. There is also something admirably daring and populist about this moment of 
MacKinnon's rhetoric. However, the artistic protection rationale of broader First Amend-
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the Exon Bill thus overlap in this respect. Exon's position that a suggestion 
or a fragment of a total work is subject to regulation is in line with MacKin-
non's strict analysis of what would make any work subject to censorship. 
The Exon Bill's "lewd, lascivious and filthy" might mesh with the specific 
politics of the model ordinance in some discrete instances. Both the Exon 
Bill and the model ordinance would seem to have a lower threshold than 
standard obscenity law for fmding certain representations illegal. Signifi-
cantly, neither proposal carves out a special space for pornography where 
only consenting adults can fmd it. The problem for Exon is that if pornog-
raphy is available, children will get to it and be hurt. MacKinnon, who 
forcefully rejects the privacy doctrine, sees the problem differently: if por-
nography exists, it creates a culture which oppresses women. 
The cornerstone of MacKinnon's and Dworkin's legislation, as they see 
it, is the effect of pornography. How women are depicted must be regulated 
because of what that depiction does. Exon's bill makes no such refmement. 
Still more dangerously, the Exon Bill's broad language may sweep up a 
good deal of the potential for grass roots organizing that the internet could 
provide. Exon has not carved out a talk space for feminist issues; this too 
would fall victim to the bill's "lewd, lascivious or indecent standard." This 
is the Act's biggest problem for W AP. It does not challenge the politics of 
what "decency" means in the way that MacKinnon and Dworkin have done. 
Instead it is an old-fashioned effort to extend First Amendment obscenity 
jurisprudence to a new medium. 
B. FEMINISTS AGAINST CENSORSHIP 
While some First Amendment commentators refer to the MacKin-
non-Dworkin alliance as "the feminist position" on pornography,142 there are 
actually many feminist positions on pornography, several of which see 
nothing feminist at all in MacKinnon's position on the First Amendment. 143 
This section will look at the conflict between feminist anti-pornography and 
feminist anti-censorship positions before exploring possible anti-censorship 
responses to the Exon Bill. 
The feminist arguments with MacKinnon's analyses and activism take 
different forms. To many feminists, MacKinnon's full-force attack bears a 
strong resemblance to older censorship efforts and old-fashioned anti-sex 
ment protection for obscenity has always had a snob odor to at least one commentator. 
MacKinnon's words express no interest in that particular elitism. See KENDRICK, supra 
note 27 (on the classism in many of the art and literary defenses to obscenity prosecutions). 
142. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to 
Pornography, Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1992); Richards, supra 
note 113; Fish, infra note 181. 
143. See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 7 (quoting Betty Friedan and Susie Bright); Hunter & 
Law, supra note 6; ANGELA CARTER, THE SADEAN WOMAN (1978); DoROTHY ALLISON, SKIN: 
T ALKlNG ABOUT SEX, CLASS AND LITERATURE (1994). 
··,t 
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moralism. l44 W AP's proscriptions have even made their way into the 1986 
Meese Commission report on Obscenity and Pornography.14S While 
equating MacKinnon's arguments with right-wing family values dis serves 
the political arguments MacKinnon brings to this debate, it is true that, 
where implemented, the Model Ordinance has produced Comstockian ef-
fects. In Defending Pornography, Nadine Strossen recounts the story of the 
application of Dworkin-MacKinnon's bill in Canada. l46 The enforcers used 
the language of the bill to stop material of any sexual description, first 
stopping pamphlets on gay health information at the US-Canadian border, 
and then prosecuting a gay book store. 147 It has not mattered that the seized 
material, as MacKinnon points out, does not resemble what the Canadian 
bill was designed to limit. The officials enforced the text of the law, not its 
spirit. They interpreted the ordinance in such a way to reinscribe a familiar 
system of anti-dissent, anti-gay values. 
This incident is more than cautionary: MacKinnon, and in this context, 
law professor and critic Stanley Fish, have done a great deal to debunk the 
neutrality myth and unmask the politics within current legal toolS. 148 
MacKinnon advocates an openly context-based, value-driven legal system. 
Unfortunately, her suggested remedies of overtly value-invested rules fail to 
take into account our culture's unwillingness to enforce a new value system. 
MacKinnon's so-called alliance with the Meese commission is a stark ex-
ample of how feminist ordinances can, have been, and will be re-interpreted 
for anti-feminist ends. While speech - here pornography - may signify a 
power relationship, it does not preexist it. Getting at the speech by itself, 
even altering the speech, does not get at power. 
Accepting and endorsing Fish and MacKinnon's lead in recognizing and 
repudiating the First Amendment's hidden politics does not necessarily lead 
to imposing another more limiting politics of one's own. If one agrees with 
Fish that the political is always present, it is nevertheless also true that there 
are different kinds of political structures, some less limiting than others. 
Feminists have advocated fewer limitations on speechl49 and argued that the 
space inadvertently left open within First Amendment jurisprudence can be 
reclaimed as a feminist space. ISO In this argument, both private unregulated 
speech and pornographic speech (which is speech protected in some ways by 
the First Amendment but would be pornographic under the Model Ordi-
144. See generally, Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of 
Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1564 (1988); Hunter & Law, supra note 
6; West, supra note 7; STROSSEN supra note 7; KENDRICK, supra note 27. 
145. West, supra note 7. 
146. STROSSEN, supra note 7, at 19,229-44. 
147. Gates notes that "homosexual literature is a frequent target of Canada's restrictions 
on freedom of expression." Gates, supra note 123, at 43. 
148. MACKINNON, supra note 11; Fish, infra note 181. 
149. STROSSEN, supra note 7, at 161-78. 
150. ld. 
• 
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nance) is speech with which women can articulate a sexuality that does not 
re-inscribe women's subordination to men. Without First Amendment pro-
tections of, at the very least, speech with political, artistic, scientific and lit-
erary value, this articulation would be censored. With them, women possess 
the right to author their own stories and representations,151 recognize domi-
nant sexual models as political models and address them politically. 152 
Feminists, people of color and gay activists have all insisted on the im-
portance of authoring their own sexual stories. 153 They view suppression of 
sexual expression as a suppression of their struggles for equality. Dissent-
ing sexual expression is fundamentally upstart and destabilizing in existing 
power structures. MacKinnon rejects the idea that there can be a female 
sexuality in a male-defmed world. l54 However, Angela Carter envisions a 
feminist pornography which is radically disruptive. It would replace critical 
male fictions about women and sex, and present a different model of women, 
and of what sex might mean, to the world. 155 Still more destabilizing is this 
imagined Wildean vision: 
Oscar Wilde today ... would not be a playwright, [he] would 
be a pornographer. Or blasphemer. Sometimes it is important 
not to be able to tell whether one is reading a poem or a 
polemic, whether one is watching a movie or a religious rite, 
whether one is inhabiting a nation or a laboratory, whether one 
is looking at a masterpiece or observing a pornographic 
spectacle. These are uncertainties - of genre, of propriety -
in whose grip I am convinced Wilde would have wanted us to 
remain. 156 
The opportunity for presenting a different set of fictions, that is, ad-
dressing, publishing and reaching an audience is vastly different online than 
off. Public discussion has misleadingly focused on certain bulletin board 
services and newsgroups that feature almost exclusively sexual storytelling 
for the male audience and male pleasure. 157 Other newsgroups have a strong 
feminist voicel58 which could grow in both value and sophistication. The 
151. See, e.g., ANGELA CARTER, THE SADEAN WOMAN; DOROTHY ALLISON, SKIN: TALKING 
ABOUT SEX, CLASS AND LITERATURE. 
152. Hunter & Law, supra note 6. 
153. See generally, CARTER, supra note 143; ALLISON, supra note 143. 
154. See MACKINNON, supra note II. 
155. See generally, CARTER, supra note 143; ALLISON, supra note 143. 
156. Wayne Koestenbaum, Obscenity: A Celebration (Meditations on the True Meaning 
of Oscar Wilde: Tried and Convicted for Gross Indecency One Hundred Years Ago), N. Y. 
TIMES, May 21 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 46-47. 
157. Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities, 
83 GEO. L.J. 1969 (1995). 
158. See e.g., "Soc. Feminism" on the Internet. See also the discussion of the internet as 
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Exon Bill would profoundly interfere with such expressive feminist uses of 
the internet. Its application would mean censorship, monitoring, and sup-
pression for all of the initiatives that pro-free speech feminists might sup-
port. Just as the movie Lady Chatterly's Lover would run afoul of the Exon 
Bill, so would many milestone feminist writings. In her 1992 keynote 
speech to the gay and lesbian writers' conference, Outwrite, Dorothy Allison 
writes about her own development as a writer, the power of rare meetings 
with other writers and the immeasurable importance of defming who she is 
to her own survival: 
I am part of a nation that is not secret but is rarely recognized. 
Born poor, queer and despised, I have always known myself 
one of many - strong not because I was different, but because I 
was part of a nation just like me, human and fragile and stubborn 
and hungry for justice in an unjust world ... I have lived my life in pur 
suit of the remade world. 159 
Allison's story is subversive in its unflinching truthfulness. It is also with-
out question, too blunt and direct to survive the Exon regime. 
Feminists have also sharply criticized MacKinnon's argument that por-
nography is the stimulus. that can and inevitably will create a violent re-
sponse in men. l60 MacKinnon says pornography creates men's violence and 
women's passivity.161 Thus men harass and rape women at pornography's 
instigation. According to MacKinnon, representations have one specific set 
of effects; they are simple, uninterpreted, and unnegotiated by other ideo-
logical factors. 162 She does not recognize the possibility that different rea-
sons cause different people to do different things; her view does not recog-
nize or value exploration, experimentation, or for that matter, pornography 
for women. Profoundly, this view negates any possibility for autonomy. 
For MacKinnon, we are programmed by pornography and autonomy is the 
delusion. 163 
MacKinnon's detractors object to privileging representation over the 
real, thereby erasing issues of agency and choice. They object to the analy-
sis that representations act as cattle-prods and create uniform reactions, in-
stead of requiring complex interpretation and negotiation within other 
frameworks. Most astonishing is MacKinnon's seeming belief that once 
these representations go away, the world will be transformed. It is an ahis-
"A lifeline for gay teens," infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
159. DOROTHY ALLISON, Survival is the Least of My Desires, in SKIN, supra note 143. 
160. Hunter & Law, supra note 6, at 127. 
161. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 36. 
162. Hunter & Law supra note 6; C. Edwin Baker, Of Course More Than Words, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1994) (book review); Branscomb, supra note 71. 
163. Id. 
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torical view that posits pornography as the source of sexual oppression, 
rather than a current, historical manifestation of living in a world defmed, in 
part, by sexual oppression. l64 
MacKinnon's stimulus/response view is shared by other advocates of 
internet regulation. Judge Bork's American Spectator article165 provides an 
instructive example of where this argument leads. In his article, Bork first 
professes he is an internet fan, and then proceeds to recount his horror at 
discovering the content of the alt.sex.stories newsgroup. While claiming to 
be relating what is wrong with the internet, he in fact relates only the par-
ticular reaction of Robert Bork, using himself as the measure of what every-
one should be. He visits the news group for the first time "enthralled," but 
soon is shocked, as was Exon, to read a ghastly story of the sexual abuse 
and mutilation of children. 166 While Bork may be right that it is problematic 
if children read such a story, it is not clear that the story should not be there 
at all, nor is it clear that this kind of writing will lead to similar action. 167 
What Bork would like to do is cast the stories out, deny them a place in any-
one's imagination, together with other sexual fantasies and practices which 
he discovered on the internet. When Bork writes about what is bad, horrify-
ing, and should be regulated, his implicit message is that "this is not me." A 
feminist analysis would question to what extent "like me" should become a 
legal standard when it simply enshrines the likes and dislikes of the hegem-
ony. 
While MacKinnon positions herself as a dissenter, her regulatory 
scheme would normalize and exclude like any other. Both she and Bork 
clash head on with the structuralist interpretation that regulating pornogra-
phy is a means of regulating sex. 168 When interpreting a regulation such as 
164. See KENDRICK, supra note 27, at 229, in particular on the ahistoricism of this view. 
165. Bork, supra note 5. 
166. There are many political problems with Bork's reaction, besides the one explored in 
the text above and below. Bork does not take this opportunity to wonder why the entrap-
ment and punishment of children seems to be a national obsession (witness the popular 
Home Alone films, the thriller Nick of Time, the openly vindictive Eye for an Eye, or the 
adventure movie Die Hard With a Vengeance). Nor does he distinguish the fact that a 
good deal of powerful literature describes abuse of children (the works of Alice Walker, 
Dorothy Allison, Kaye Gibbons and Toni Morrison are a few of many examples) some ar-
guably as extreme as the story he encountered (See, e.g., Shusaku Endo's Scandal). Bork 
might argue that we can tell the difference between literature and a story in alt.sex.stories. 
Maybe he could, maybe we could. But could a censor? We could also pause for a moment 
to reflect on why someone such as Judge Bork gets his education in shock literature 
uniquely from the internet, or why ifhe got it elsewhere (such as a local bookstore selling 
Brett Easton Ellis, or Eric McCormick's Paradise Hotel, or Catherine Texier's anthology 
of New York Fiction) it is only the internet that commands his attention for regulatory pur-
poses. 
167. This is a belief that Bork shares with MacKinnon, and is the impetus for the restric-
tion on the use of pornography as an assault in the Model Ordinance. Supra note 122. 
168. KENDRICK, supra note 27, at 28 (drawing from the model of normalizing in MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978)). 
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this one, a judge, lawyer, government enforcer engages in a normalizing 
process while deciding questions about what is harmful and what should be 
regulated. This power analysis is all the more important in the internet con-
text, where all forms of communications could easily be monitored and over-
seen, creating an immediate and present gaze of the censor. Even the sym-
pathetic censor who names, approves and blesses the most outrageous 
communications engages in normalizing. A feminism which is skeptical of 
the censor's norm/other dichotomy would reject MacKinnon's reinscription. 
MacKinnon seeks to eliminate pornography in order to protect women. 
This is a questionable means to an end which is arguably not advantageous 
to women. The Exon Bill would like to regulate to protect children. This is 
also suspect under a feminist analysis. When the protection of children is 
the rationale, many communications become suspect. 
The news story of Daniel Montgomery and Damien Starr is an example 
of the deeper issues that are at stake, beyond control of a medium, when the 
internet is ostensibly controlled for the sake of protecting our children. 
Daniel, a Washington fifteen-year-old, met Damien Starr online and went 
to meet him in San Francisco. When the press found out, it reported the 
story as an adult kidnapping of a minor, something which Exon says hap-
pens hundreds of times all over the internet. 169 In fact, the police have re-
ported an approximate figure of ten to twelve instances of solicitation of mi-
nors. l7O But in this case, Damien turned out to be a teenager too, who was 
thrown out of his own home because he is gay. Daniel characterizes his trip 
to San Francisco not as a kidnapping, but as a running away with encour-
agement. "I want everyone to understand there was nothing but friendly 
contact," Daniel says, referring to Damien and the adults with whom 
Damien now lives.171 Daniel is back at home. 
Perhaps it is risky for children to talk on the internet. Perhaps, accept-
ing police statistics, the other nine episodes were far less friendly!72 Per-
haps these were not the full facts of Daniel Montgomery and Damien Starr's 
story. But the underlying issue in this story is not internet. It sounds instead 
very much like a story about a teenager who began discovering his own 
sexuality in a home that was not receptive. He then found and visited some-
one who alleviated his isolation. A case like this really deals with control-
ling sexual identity. Perhaps the internet is being used to exert an influence 
on people like Daniel that is worrisome. But the discussion is not being 
carried out around the issues of people evolving new identities or discovering 
their different sexualities. Instead we are legislating against cybersmut, cy-
169. 141 CONGo REc. S8087-04 (1995) (Exon's floor remarks). 
170. OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, supra note 87. 
171. Id. 
172. At least one ended in the conviction of a 28 year old man. 
Winter 1997] A FEMINIST RESPONSE TO THE EXON BILL 107 
berporn and cyberfilth. Children and adults may be using the internet to 
voice sexuality, but what bothers the Exon Bills' backers, really, is the 
sexuality itself, not the medium. "Someone should stop this," says Judge 
Bork, 173 believing as MacKinnon does, that this will make what he fmds so 
disturbing go away. The internet is eroding our society, says Senator 
Exon,174 by which he means that his vision of society is submerged by cha-
otic, competing visions that he finds on the internet. 
Faced with those visions, the Exon Bill proposes to take freedom of 
speech a long leap backwards in time, taking fundamental feminist advances 
with it. This is all much more like Comstock than Miller, or for that matter, 
FCC v. Pacifica. The bill proposes to replace the sexual dialogue that the 
internet has brought to light with silence. Exon justifies this silence with 
providing the greatest good for children. MacKinnon would argue that it is 
for the good of women. 175 But an anti-censorship feminism must reject this 
silence and show that silence, not privacy, is the repressive, sexu-
ally-subordinating regime, and that within silence, old power hierarchies re-
assert themselves. 
IV. STUCK BETWEEN TWO WORLD VIEWS 
The question this discussion poses is whether progressive feminism 
should repudiate internet legislation at all costs. However, to stumble to-
wards that inevitable would be to move from one set of problems into an-
other, and would ignore an imperative posed by Robin West: not just to ac-
knowledge but to "insist on the contradictions in women's experiences of 
pornography.,,176 While it is not the purpose of this paper to reconcile these 
contradictions directly, the competing visions create a deadlock over regula-
tion such as the Exon Bill. It is the project of the last two parts of this paper 
to analyze briefly the intransigence of these two positions and then to pro-
vide a proposed model in which the two responses could, to some extent, 
co-exist. 
Anti-censorship feminist arguments are less convincing when confronted 
with pornography's more limited role as an implement of sexual harassment. 
The presence of a vast archive of pornography on the internet is not some-
how in and of itself harassment. But continual ongoing reduction of one's 
self and one's possibilities to one's sex or the possibility of sex is harass-
ment. It is exactly the kind of harassment which suits the internet, a largely 
male enclave with anonymous communication. The anti-censorship group 
has not presented an answer for how to address this. l77 
173. Bork, supra note 5. 
174. 141 CONGo REc. S8087-04 (1995) (Exon's floor remarks). 
175. MACKINNON, supra note 122. 
176. West, supra note 7, at 710-11. 
177. One answer is to flood the internet with feminist net surfers. This solution brings to 
. 
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The intractability and self-investment of the free speech and 
anti-pornography positions are presented in the following analyses of two 
opposing dilemmas in obscenity law. What is revealing about both of these 
analyses is the extent to which both MacKinnon's views and anti-censorship 
views share a totalizing vision. 
A. THE CLASH OF VISIONS 
In the fIrst example, from The Secret Museum, Walter Kendrick quotes 
Richard Nixon disavowing the fmdings of the 1970 Report of the Attorney 
General's Commission on Pornography and Obscenity.178 That report made 
the determination that most obscenity laws should be repealed, that neither 
pornography nor obscenity was bad for the public, and a host of other fmd-
ings which shocked the President. Kendrick cites Nixon's speech to a group 
of would-be Nixon supporters. Nixon promised a new Commission that 
would produce a different set of not-so-appalling fmdings. For "if this cur-
rent report is true," said Nixon, "it would mean a complete change in all our 
values." But "ten minutes of common sense" show that pornography is not 
able to do this.179 What Nixon is saying by this, writes Kendrick, is that: 
If an attitude of permissiveness were to be adopted regarding 
pornography, this would contribute to an atmosphere condoning 
anarchy in every other field-and would increase the threat to our 
social order as well as to our moral principles. It is supremely 
ironic that 'worthless trash' like pornography should drive even 
a president to the brink of that abyss. [But then] the unthinkable 
last step was never taken. 180 
In the second example, which echoes the fIrst, Stanley Fish walks 
through Judge Frank Easterbrook's evaluation of MacKinnon's Model Or-
dinance and its ramifications for Indianapolis. 181 Here, Easterbrook con-
templates MacKinnon's ordinance, a document that would impose strict 
controls on speech and also presents a confrontation with a different world. 
Easterbrook accepts the law's premise that pornography [speech] is harmful 
to women, but recoils from it immediately.182 To Easterbrook, "If the fact 
light the initial problem of access to internet technology. This is also a critical feminist 
enterprise that this paper does not address. Flooding the net with women is the most 
complete answer in many respects, but it presupposes that models which exist for recourse 
offline also exist online. I do not think that they currently do. 
178. KENDRICK, supra note 27, at 219-21. 
179. Id. at 220. 
180. Id. 
181. Stanley Fish. Fraught with Death: Skepticism, Progressivism and the First Amend-
ment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061 (1993). 
182. Id. at 1066. 
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that speech plays a greater role in a process of conditioning were enough to 
permit governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of 
speech." I 83 According to Fish, Easterbrook almost completely changes his 
view of the "rights" world, but then suddenly does not. 184 
Both of these visions rely on the trans formative power of government 
action, even though the desired action is different for each critic. For one, 
accepting the model ordinance brings the recognition of politics in law. For 
the other, the repeal of obscenity laws, would lead to a transformative anar-
chy. Both visions rely on an unacknowledged posture of advocating a com-
pletely new world, a radical vision of that which is possible but which is not 
here now. Both also are based on a notion of a pent-up otherness, kept at 
bay by cultural and legal mechanisms which are operating just beyond 
reach. 
But sexual discourse - here pornography and obscenity - resists these 
postures because pornography is both what its detractors say it is, and what 
its proponents want it to be. I85 Because pornography depicts sexuality, it is 
political: it is what feminists want to protect and it is bland, insensitive, and 
injurious, so much so that we as feminists want it to go away. The problem 
with explicit sexual representation, particularly in the form of explicit sexual 
harassment on the internet, is that it has real, negative effects and it needs to 
be protected. 
How then, can both needs be met? Once the single view of pornography 
has revealed its false dream of transformation, the understanding that there 
are real interests to be protected emerges. Then the answer, rather than be-
ing rooted in radical transformations, is a pragmatically worked out under-
standing of limits around the protection of self and recourse for when self, 
community, work or privacy is invaded. What also becomes apparent is that 
the blanket issue of speech regulation recedes, and the more particularized 
self emerges. This is not to suggest that "self' exists prior to or without 
protected speech, but rather that a level of particularity is required to under-
stand why speech matters, and why regulating the category of "speech" is 
not the answer. 
Finding the real problems that affect real people is difficult in this area 
because these persons are the best and only ones to know when it has hap-
pened. The questions which need to be answered are ones from practical 
experience, all of them highly relevant to the internet environment: what 
does a harassing invasion of privacy do to expression, interaction, work, or 
183. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 330. 
184. Fish, supra note 181, at 1066. Here is an instance writes Fish: "[of] one of the 
most interesting (and least commented upon) moments in intellectual discourse, the mo-
ment ... when the path of inquiry a practitioner is following points in a direction that fills 
him (or her) with horror, and as a result, the inquiry is abandoned, short of its distressing 
conclusion." Id. 
185. This, again, is one of Robin West's central insights. West, supra note 7, at 710-11. 
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study? 
There are several archetypal cases of harassment and invasion on the 
internet which exemplify the relevancy of these questions. One is "Pamela's 
Ordeal." In this case, a Michigan student named Jake Baker wrote a very 
violent pornographic story about a young woman. 186 He used the real name 
of a classmate for his title character who he then fictionally imprisoned, 
tortured, raped and finally burned. Because the language and events of the 
story almost certainly come under the prohibitions of the Exon Bill, Baker 
would surely have been prosecuted had the bill been in force. But Baker's 
prosecution, by the government, does not advance a feminist interest, nor 
does it advance the rights of Pamela. It does not address her injury, as 
phrased in any of the questions above. It turns Baker into a free speech 
martyr and Exon into a vindicated legislator. Exon does not address the 
particularity of Pamela's injury. His bill transforms people into issues, 
which takes away speech (from Baker) and self (from Pamela). 
In Internet Babylon, Anne Wells Branscomb provides another arche-
typal internet harassment case with the episode of Mr. Bungle and the 
Lambda MOO.187 In her account, a group of people anonymously gathered 
to experiment with an electronic group workspace. The purpose and expec-
tation of the gathering was to learn about and evaluate an online collabora-
tive environment. The common understanding of the group members was 
that people were there to work. One anonymous participant, Mr. Bungle, 
started harassing a female participant (also anonymous) with graphic and 
violent sexual threats. 
Both of these cases demonstrate the strong potential for alienation in the 
internet environment. At the same time, the kind of activity that is identified 
as an injury is very narrowly defmed. There is strong evidence that the har-
asser knew what he was doing by reaching into someone else's privacy or 
private expectations, either thoughtlessly as in Jake Baker's case, or delib-
eratelyas in Mr. Bungle's. These activities do not fail for a lack of statu-
tory notice. They also illustrate the inappropriateness of a sweeping speech 
regulation, since they are unrelated to the solicitation of minors or to the 
bulletin board services that provide pornographic images to willing investors 
in their products. Instead, their importance turns on specific and local reac-
tions. What they also reveal is the lack of a framework to work through 
those local reactions. 
v. CONCLUSION: A KIND OF REGULATION 
The first section of this paper briefly outlined a small piece of First 
186. Jim Schaefer, Second Man Indicted for Sending Computer Mail About Torturing 
Girls, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 16,1995, at A5. 
187. Branscomb, supra note 71, at 1951. 
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Amendment history and the rulings that brought about the current Miller 
standard. It also presented the problems of applying Miller to the new inter-
net technologies. Section II presented The Communications Decency Act 
itself and laid out some of the Act's conflicts with current First Amendment 
holdings. Section III speculated about reactions of anti-pornography femi-
nists to the bill and offered a feminist, anti-censorship response which would 
protect the internet against the bill's restrictions. In Section IV, the conflict 
between these two positions was analyzed further to reveal certain inconsis-
tencies internal to each position. Section IV also introduced the specific is-
sue of on-line harassment as a potential area of feminist agreement. Finally, 
in this section, an alternate, privately organized regulatory scheme is out-
lined. This section concludes with some thoughts on activism for feminists 
in this area. 
A. FOUNDATIONAL RULES 
Prior to the enactment of the bill, the internet was regulated in part by 
various commercial and market interests. Feminists need to become in-
volved in this, to protect their own interests, because neither the Exon Bill 
nor the consortium of private regulators are poised to do it. Although there 
are free speech advocates trying to protect different internet interests, it does 
not follow that all feminist interests will be represented. What is critical is a 
pro-free speech position that recognizes certain types of harassment but 
distances itself from government regulation that limits the potential of the 
internet as a feminist resource. 
First any scheme that can negotiate these positions would need to be pri-
vately, as opposed to governmentally, enforced. This avoids the specter of 
government censorship and monitoring discussed earlier. This system could 
take advantage of the different communications models that already make up 
the internet. In the earlier analysis of obscenity law and later feminist cri-
tiques of that body of law, governmental defmitions of permissible sexual 
expression conflicted in practical ways with privacy, self-determination, no-
tice about what is forbidden, and what constitutes the impermissible. A 
scheme that would facilitate the defmition of boundaries between people and 
different spaces on the internet would be a start. The dangers of such a 
scheme are potentially enormous - particularly in light of the radical democ-
racy that many people believe the internet provides. For now, it is important 
to keep in mind that any discussion of boundaries must also reject a 
re-stratification of information and access to information. It must strive to 
provide borders without necessarily being exclusionary. 
Currently there are many self-imposed boundaries on the internet: pri-
vate news groups, private areas, owners that gate access to certain discus-
sions. There is a powerful position that the internet should remain 
self-regulating in this regard. This proposal suggests that an independent 
Wi *W 
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group of internet users, service providers, university faculties, staff and stu-
dents, other academics, libraries and community groups that use the internet 
be involved in defming boundaries around areas. This discussion is already 
happening, but largely either within or dominated by the software indus-
try.ISS Feminists need to participate in order to preserve the richness of this 
resource and to open up its largely male participation to women. 
B. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACES 
The discussion of boundary needs to address the difference between 
public and private space on the internet because they pose distinct problems. 
The recourse for, or response to, a boundary infringement in each case 
would be very different. A private space, for example, is one in which an 
individual has a certain expectation of the kinds of interaction that will take 
place and the kinds of things that a person might receive. We do not have to 
reinscribe Stanley's suspect category of privacy in doing this. When we de-
fme privacy and draw a line around a private space based on a subjective 
expectation, we avoid creating an internet "home" in which old power hier-
archies reassert themselves. Is9 
The Lambda MOO example from Anne Wells Branscomb's article is a 
good example of an expectation within a certain defmed workspace. There, 
an infringement occurred when a woman was unexpectedly and violently 
harassed by an anonymous person who used the space for a purpose she 
neither expected nor wished. This violent invasion of space is akin to a no-
tion of trespass. Because "trespass" assumes boundaries, such boundaries 
would need to be established and understood. Defming boundaries and 
making them known is the function of the group of internet users introduced 
above. 
The woman's actual response was to eliminate Mr. Bungle from the 
workgroup.I90 Electronically eliminating the harasser is a fairly standard 
recommended procedure in many bulletin board services. It is one of the few 
solutions when the aggressor is anonymous. It is also an effective, albeit 
temporary, solution. Branscomb reports that Mr. Bungle resurfaced else-
where. If there had been real defmitions of boundaries, this episode might 
have ended differently. Some spaces, such at this one, could be workspaces, 
and the people in them would be at work. In this scenario, a person who 
wishes to work cannot be absolutely anonymous: there would need to be a 
gatekeeper with names of the workspace users. Anonymity would be main-
tained however, unless there were an infringement that met the current, legal 
188. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 5. 
189. MacKinnon and many others. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 122; Fran Olsen, 
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
1497 (1983). 
190. Branscomb, supra note 71. 
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harassment standard. 191 A suit could be brought under Title VII, because 
the harassment had taken place in a workspace. 192 Because the kinds of 
work and collective workspaces on the internet do not correspond to a typi-
cal office and may involve people collaborating or sharing a server for a 
number of different reasons, the kinds of areas designated as actual work-
spaces must be carefully defmed. 
Another application of the borders or space idea applies to more public 
spaces. Here, knowing use of a person's name or image, published on the 
internet, could constitute defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Defamation could be punished by revocation of internet privileges, 
or actual suits could be brought. 193 What is important here is the actor's 
level of awareness. Using someone's name or morphing someone's image to 
create, for example, pornographic images or a story such as Baker's sug-
gests the actor had a fairly high level of understanding of what is going on. 
Boundaries help defme the actor's level of knOWledge. Winning such a suit 
for an infringement would not be easy, assuming that one has the funds to do 
SO.194 But it is an important form of recourse for a private individual such 
as "Pamela.,,195 Moving towards a model which defmes permissible actions, 
communications and places is an advancement for internet freedoms and 
protections. 
C. THE CABLE AND BROADCAST MODELS POINT THE WAY 
A more formalized conception of internet zones, or communities would 
help to address the community decency standard issue posed by current ob-
scenity law. Rather than being defmed by geographic zones, the communi-
ties could be defmed as content or rated zones explicitly understood as dif-
ferent from a larger common zone. Movement across a boundary into a 
zone would be conscious and voluntary on the part of the viewer, much like 
across a marked, "physical" border. "Boundaries" could be maintained 
within levels of passwords, or a warning screen. In this case, the screen 
might warn about how a zone is "rated." A viewer/traveler would have the 
191. The aggressed person would need to establish that (1) she or he was subjected to 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive 
working environment. Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 1006 (1989). 
192. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
193. The Model Ordinance was modified to include a defamation statute. See DEBATING 
SEXUAL CORRECTNESS, supra note 122, at 277. 
194. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
195. The difficulty in a public defamation/intentional infliction of emotional distress case 
such as this one has typically been that they are brought by public persons against the press 
and the Court has pointed to fame as an occupational hazard and to the need not to "chill" 
the press. Id. 
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responsibility of accepting the values of the community he or she entered.196 
The nature of the protection around the zone also answers the child access 
problem. In the cable television model, the cable companies aided in the 
channeling efforts by providing lock boxes and scrambling devices. 197 The 
software industry is rising to the occasion with numerous internet locks and 
keys. 198 
While problematic, "zones" of this nature have been formulated and 
theorized in other contexts, adapted for movies and for limitations on broad-
cast viewing. Internet regulation could allow for different levels of speech, 
however, from the most open in certain zones, to more restrictive, and based 
on certain understandings, in others. This model could draw on codes some 
universities have devised which regulate certain forms of speech on cam-
pUS. I99 The most restrictive zones are analogous to the most intimate pri-
vacy in someone's home; slightly less restrictive zones would be more simi-
lar to the classroom and the most open would be the areas which are, as 
some theorists claim, unregulable.200 The campus model for parts of the in-
ternet is appropriate, given the educative and resource functions internet 
serves. 
The problem with zoning proposals is they risk recreating a milieu the 
internet opposes: stratification. Should the internet's defiant anarchy be al-
tered at all? This proposal leaves far more of that anarchy intact than does 
the Exon Bill. This model deliberately retains a great deal of the anarchy, if 
we are prepared to entertain or at least humor the idea that anarchy can be 
zoned. Further, it strives to avoid imposing specific, particularized, obsta-
cles to other communities joining the internet. The internet would become 
more radical, not less, when everyone has access to it. The pornography de-
bate is one obstacle to free access. The next step is providing physical ac-
cess to technology for people, especially schools, all of whom can benefit 
from it, and risk being severely disenfranchised without it. Working toward 
equal access is the best feminist enterprise today. 
Epilogue 
As mentioned at the start of this note, since its passage the Communica-
196. Senator Patrick Leahy, in his counter proposal to the Exon bill is working on a 
model very much like this one. Nat Hentoff, The Senate's Cybercensors, WASH. POST, July 
1, 1995, at Cl. 
197. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
198. See, e.g., Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 5, listing the Net Nanny and Surfwatch, and an-
nouncing that Netscape is coming out with another product soon. 
199. See, e.g., Stanford's ordinance in Charles R. Lawrence m, If He Hollers Let Him 
Go: Regulating Racist Hate Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND 53, 53-88 (1993); 
see also Gates, supra note 123. 
200. See generally Strossen, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX, supra note 123 
(responding to Charles Lawrence's proposal). 
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tions Decency Act has twice been challenged in court.201 Both courts found 
that the Act is unconstitutional, based upon the Act's overbroad and vague 
reliance on the word "indecent. ,,202 Both courts also issued an injunction 
against prosecutions under the Act. 203 While neither opinion addressed the 
particularized conflicts of contemporary First Amendment law and internet 
technology that this note has explored, both opinions salute the advent of the 
internet as a major advance for freedom of expression, and seek to protect its 
growth. 204 
As expected, the government has appealed these rulings. On December 
5, 1996, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.205 
201. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (1996); American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 




205. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, _U.S. -' 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996). 
